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1Introduction 
by  RICHELLE BERNAZZOLI
Is the European Union headed toward a single, 
integrated fighting force? !is question was posed at 
the fourth annual Transatlantic Security Symposium, 
which was held March 9, 2011 at the University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. !e event addressed 
the possible formation of a robust and autono-
mous European defense apparatus under the Treaty 
of Lisbon, which took effect in December 2009. 
European security experts Jean-Yves Haine (Univer-
sity of Toronto), Jolyon Howorth (Yale University), 
and Alistair Shepherd (Aberystwyth University, UK) 
discussed this possibility and the accompanying issues 
and implications for Europe, the United States, and 
the international community. !is issue of Swords 
and Ploughshares represents the published results 
of the symposium and provides an account of the 
experts’ perspectives on the EU’s ability to speak with 
one voice on foreign, security, and defense matters.
Over the last two decades, there has been no 
shortage of pronouncements—from scholars and 
practitioners alike—about the prospects for the EU’s 
future as a global security actor. Detractors repeatedly 
cite the most glaring failures in recent EU history—
such as the inability to provide a coherent response 
to the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo and the heavily-
publicized divisions over the war in Iraq—as evidence 
that the twenty-seven (soon twenty-eight) member 
states face insurmountable obstacles to further 
security and defense integration. At the heart of the 
matter, for many observers, is the tricky issue of 
nation-state sovereignty—which most governments 
and publics continue to privilege when it comes 
to the question of defense. !is was the subtext to 
Margaret !atcher’s derision of the UK’s contribu-
tion to the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) 
as “a piece of monumental folly that puts our security 
at risk in order to satisfy political vanity” (White 
and Norton-Taylor 2000). Others have asserted that 
deeper security and defense integration is hindered 
primarily by economic hardship, as when political 
scientist Andrew Moravcsik (2008, 27) noted, “A 
truly independent European defense policy, including 
the development of European transport, air and space 
resources, would cost some two percent of Euro-
pean GDP—a political impossibility at a time when 
budget cuts are critical.”
Nevertheless, modest progress has been made on 
this front, with the Lisbon Treaty potentially spur-
ring some significant developments in the foresee-
able future. While continual resistance within EU 
member states and institutions does threaten to 
hamper the defense integration agenda, important 
incentives exist for the further development of an 
independent security and defense apparatus. Not least 
among these has been the shifting remit of NATO, 
a security organization that has experienced its own 
“existential crisis” of late (as discussed in the Summer 
2008 issue of Swords and Ploughshares). With that, 
US officials have made it increasingly clear that the 
days of the American military superpower as the 
primary guarantor of European security are gone. 
!e June 2011 speech by outgoing US Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates, which amounted to a rebuke 
of European governments’ reluctance to operate as 
equal partners in their own defense, exemplified this 
sentiment. 
!e articles that follow deal with the complex 
issue of EU security and defense from diverse per-
spectives, illuminating the many questions that con-
tinue to shape the debate. In the first piece, Alistair 
Shepherd provides an overview of the EU’s evolution 
as a global security actor, from the 1998 Franco-
British Saint-Malo Declaration to the establishment 
of the European Defense Agency in 2004, and more 
recently, the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, which, in his assess-
ment, offers some limited potential for innovation. 
Shepherd discusses some of the key nation-state-
level factors that have often worked to hamper the 
development of supranational military capabilities, 
including cumbersome national debts and low public 
support for further European integration in many 
member states. However, he ends on what may be 
described as the most optimistic note in the collec-
tion of articles, suggesting that it is the financial and 
economic struggles themselves—coupled with the 
shifting focus of US foreign and defense policy—that 
may ultimately spur defense integration. Despite 
persistent concerns over sovereignty, Shepherd posits, 
the pooling of defense assets and capabilities may be 
the clearest way for European national militaries to 
maintain a role in the global security arena.
!e second article, from Jean-Yves Haine, 
assumes a more critical tone, observing that the 
EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) 
has already been “buried in the sand of Libya” less 
than two decades after the botched handling of the 
Srebrenica genocide prompted strides in European 
2defense integration. While important milestones 
such as the forging of the Battle Group concept have 
been achieved, he asserts, key mechanisms, such as 
common funding, are still crucially lacking. Haine 
lays out three pivotal obstacles to the Europeanization 
of security and defense: weak security institutions, 
differences over the proper application of CSDP 
capabilities, and a lack of a unified strategic culture. 
!e possibility for the multifarious forces within the 
EU to successfully coalesce around a postmodern 
agenda of “human security” is anything but certain, 
and the author notes that now even the most stalwart 
supporters of EU security and defense integration 
have become dissatisfied with the process. Neverthe-
less, Haine concludes, the need for a viable CSDP 
will only increase over time.
!e third and final article, from Jolyon Howorth, 
continues the critical analysis by scrutinizing the 
latest display of CSDP action/inaction: the halting 
and incoherent EU response to the Middle East 
uprisings, which began in December 2010 and 
continue at the time of writing. !e so-called Arab 
Spring has posed a consequential test for the recently-
created EU position of High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President 
of the Commission (HR-VP), occupied by Catherine 
Ashton of the UK. As Howorth notes, this new posi-
tion and other institutional changes created by the 
Lisbon Treaty failed to provide the common voice 
the EU has sought in foreign and security policy. 
In examining the failure (so far) of the institutional 
developments to add more weight and substance to 
the EU’s crisis management capabilities, he outlines 
two broad sets of factors: diplomatic/institutional and 
political/military. Despite these significant difficulties, 
Howorth contests the notion that the HR-VP posi-
tion is “impossible to assume,” insisting instead that 
with proper leadership, the EU could, indeed, speak 
with one voice in foreign and security affairs.
!e three articles comprising this issue emphasize 
varying aspects of the ongoing debate about EU 
Common Security and Defense Policy, and each 
offers slightly different prospects for the future of the 
EU as a viable international security actor. However, 
they are united in asserting that the global geopoliti-
cal picture is shifting, and that Europe must change 
along with it in order to remain relevant and ensure 
its continued security.
Finally, it should be noted that the symposium 
and this issue of Swords and Ploughshares were both 
made possible by the ongoing collaboration between 
ACDIS and the European Union Center at the 
University of Illinois, and were supported, in part, by 
the EU Center’s U.S. Department of Education Title 
VI grant. Sincere thanks go to the ACDIS and EUC 
staffs, as well as the three speakers and contributing 
authors for their efforts.
References
Moravcsik, Andrew. 2008. “European Integration: Looking 
Ahead.” Great Decisions 2008. http://www.princeton.
edu/~amoravcs/library/decisions.pdf.
White, Michael and Richard Norton-Taylor, “Irate Blair 
savages !atcher,” !e Guardian, November 23, 2000.
3Short Takes
The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a 
common defence policy. !is will lead to a common defence, when the European 
Council, acting unanimously, so decides.
—Treaty of Lisbon, effective December 2009
Indeed, if current trends in the decline of European defense capabilities are not 
halted and reversed, future U.S. political leaders– those for whom the Cold War was 
not the formative experience that it was for me – may not consider the return on 
America’s investment in NATO worth the cost.
—Robert Gates, US Secretary of Defense, in his final address to the NATO Council in Brussels, June 10, 2011
The policy of the Union in accordance with this article shall not prejudice the 
specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states, which 
see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, under 
the North Atlantic Treaty, and be compatible with the common security and defence 
policy established within that framework.
—Treaty of Lisbon
[ESDP] wastes already meagre continental European defence budgets on EU 
structures that mirror proven NATO institutions. 
—Geoffrey van Orden, Member of the European Parliament, 2003
European countries need to make more of a contribution in terms of defence 
capabilities. It is not fair to keep turning to our ally in the United States to 
contribute military forces to problems which involve our own security.
—Geoff Hoon, British Defence Secretary, 2004
The states will make further surrenders of sovereignty if, but only if, they have to in 
the attempt to survive. Appealing though the idea of a united Europe is, the strength 
of the European Community does not lie in that abstract appeal.
—Alan Milward, Economic historian, 1992
Pro Pace Unum (Together For Peace)
—motto on the Common Security and Defence Policy Service Medal for Civilian and Military Service members of 
CSDP missions
4NATO Member Countries
Courtesy of NATO
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6Articles
 The UK supported CSDP 
as a way of making Europe a 
stronger partner for the US, 
while the French wanted to 
make Europe more autono-
mous from the US.
!e Lisbon Treaty and CSDP: 
Is the EU Closer to a European 
Army?
by  ALISTAIR J .K.  SHEPHERD
The Lisbon Treaty (LT) was heralded as a milestone 
on the road to the European Union (EU), becom-
ing a more coherent and effective global security 
actor. !e struggle to get the LT signed and ratified 
was a long and fraught process, eventually enter-
ing into force in December 2009. !ere was a lot 
of emphasis on foreign policy in the LT as the EU 
strived to improve the leadership and coordination of 
EU foreign policy. However, an examination of the 
changes the LT made to the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) specifically reveals that rather 
than innovation, the treaty focuses on formalizing 
developments and decisions that had already been 
agreed.
!e present article is in four parts. First, it 
provides a brief summary of CSDP’s development. 
Second, it analyses the LT’s impact on CSDP and the 
EU’s military capability ambitions. !ird, the article 
provides an overview of recent political and economic 
factors shaping national defense policy across EU 
member states. !e fourth and concluding section 
argues that despite the lack of political or public 
support, economic pressures at the national level may 
necessitate further collaboration, and are possibly 
more important for the future of Europe’s armed 
forces than political initiatives at the EU level.
From Saint-Malo to Lisbon
CSDP, known as the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) until the LT, emerged from the 
Franco-British Saint-Malo Declaration in December 
1998. !e principal objective was not to develop 
a standing European Army, but to improve EU 
member states’ military capabilities for crisis manage-
ment operations. !e UK supported CSDP as a 
way of making Europe a stronger partner for the 
US, while the French wanted to make Europe more 
autonomous from the US. !ese differences contrib-
uted to the problems that hampered CSDP’s devel-
opment from its launch at the Cologne European 
Council in June 1999 to the LT coming into force 
in December 2009. While the establishment of an 
operational CSDP is a politically dramatic advance 
for the EU, improvements in military capabilities 
have not been as impressive.
!e Cologne European Council outlined CSDP’s 
range of missions and its institutional architecture. 
CSDP was to be able to undertake the so-called 
Petersberg Tasks, adopted by the EU in the Amster-
dam Treaty, which encompassed humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat 
forces in crisis management, including peacemak-
ing. !e new institutions, which were to oversee and 
manage this policy and these operations, were the 
Political and Security Committee, an EU Military 
Committee, and an EU Military Staff. In December 
1999 the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) set the EU 
the objective of being able to deploy 60,000 troops 
plus supporting aerial and naval assets within sixty 
days, sustainable for at least a year, by the end of 
2003. In November 2000, at the Capability Com-
mitment Conference, EU governments pledged to 
make available 100,000 troops, 400 combat aircraft, 
and 100 naval vessels to CSDP. !ese appeared to 
be impressive commitments. However, by the end of 
2001, it was clear that crucial capabilities for rapidly 
deployable crisis management operations, such as 
strategic lift, aerial refueling, intelligence and recon-
naissance, precision munitions, and command and 
control, were lacking. !e first coordinated effort to 
rectify the shortcomings was the launch of European 
Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) in 2002. !e ECAP 
identified a “framework nation” to lead on procur-
ing common assets and tasked states to find interim 
solutions to capability shortfalls (such as leasing for 
airlift operations). Nevertheless, by the end of 2003, 
the HHG had not been met. 
!is did not stop CSDP becoming operational in 
2003. !e first two EU military missions, in Mace-
donia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), while numerically small, were significant 
for the EU as an emerging crisis manager and as a 
symbolic shift away from its civilian power image. 
!ey also influenced the subsequent revision of the 
EU’s military capability aspirations. Having failed 
to meet the HHG by 2003, a new Headline Goal 
2010 (HG2010) was announced in June 2004. !e 
HG2010 announced the establishment of the civil-
military cell in the EUMS and the European Defence 
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Agency (EDA), and called for improved strategic lift 
(air, land, and sea) and communications, the avail-
ability of an aircraft carrier with air wing and escort, 
and quantitative benchmarks for deployability and 
multinational training. !e most high profile capabil-
ity development in the HG2010 was the concept of 
EU Battle Groups. !ese battle groups, to be opera-
tional in 2007, were to be 1,500 strong, deployable 
within five to ten days, sustainable for thirty to pos-
sibly 120 days, with two battle groups on standby in 
any six-month period to undertake the full range of 
Petersberg Tasks. While the 2007 deadline was met, 
the quality of the battle groups varied substantially, 
and no battle group has yet been deployed. 
!e continuing malaise in capability improve-
ment led the 2008 French Presidency of the EU to 
“re-launch” European defense. !e December 2008 
Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities reiterated 
the need to be able to deploy 60,000 troops in sixty 
days and underlined the types of missions CSDP was 
to be able to undertake: major stabilization opera-
tions, battle group deployments, the evacuation of 
EU citizens, civil-military assistance, and civilian mis-
sions. !e Declaration also tried to restart capability 
improvements focusing on force projection, informa-
tion gathering and space-based intelligence, force 
protection and effectiveness, and interoperability. In 
a precursor to later developments, the Declaration 
highlighted the need for the pooling of efforts, spe-
cialization, and capabilities to get the improvements 
required while spreading the costs.
In the ten years between CSDP’s launch in 1999 
and the LT entering into force in 2009, there were 
a number of significant developments. !e EU’s 
move away from a civilian power, UK leadership in 
CSDP’s early years, the institutional architecture, and 
operational record are all dramatic shifts for the EU 
and for European defense more broadly. Neverthe-
less, actual improvements in European military 
capabilities were relatively minor. !is pattern of 
political-institutional development, but little military 
improvement, is replicated in the LT.
!e Lisbon Treaty: Innovative or Duplication?
While foreign, security, and defense policy are closely 
interconnected, the LT is less of a significant advance 
for CSDP as such than for EU foreign policy more 
broadly. !e treaty made some minor changes to 
decision-making procedures while ensuring CFSP/
CSDP continued to have a distinct decision-
making regime by limiting roles for the Commis-
sion, European Parliament and European Court of 
Justice. It gave the EU a legal personality, allowing 
it to sign international agreements and conventions, 
while also providing the EU with a President of the 
European Council who would represent the EU 
externally. Perhaps more significant for CSDP are 
the introduction of the enhanced and dual-hatted 
position of High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (a de facto foreign 
minister), combining the roles of High Representa-
tive for CFSP with External Relations Commissioner, 
and the European External Action Service (EEAS), 
which is to coordinate all aspects of foreign policy 
and external action and take over EU delegations in 
third countries. !ese are, potentially, very important 
for enhancing the EU’s international role, yet many 
of the “innovations” for CSDP per se were merely 
formalizing previous developments. 
!e first such “rubber stamping” of earlier deci-
sions was the broadening of the Petersberg Tasks. !e 
LT formally added joint disarmament operations, 
military advice and assistance tasks, conflict preven-
tion, post-conflict stabilization, and support to third 
countries in combating terrorism. However, the 
HG2010 had already extended the tasks to include 
disarmament, security sector reform, and the fight 
against terrorism. Second, the LT allows for smaller 
groups of member states that have the political will 
and necessary capabilities, with the agreement of the 
other EU states, to undertake a mission on behalf of 
the EU. Again, this has, in practice, already taken 
place, and many operations, such as Artemis in the 
DRC and the EU’s operation in Chad, worked on 
this basis. !ird, the LT formally established the 
European Defence Agency (EDA), despite having 
become operational in 2004. Fourth, the LT gave 
a treaty basis to the Solidarity Clause, in which 
member states agreed to assist each other, includ-
ing militarily, in the event of a terrorist attack. !is 
clause originated in the failed Constitutional Treaty, 
and member states had agreed to act in the spirit of 
this clause after the Madrid terrorist attacks of March 
2004. 
!e rather limited significance of the LT for 
CSDP per se is also illustrated by the fact that it had 
no role in the establishment of the new Crisis Man-
agement and Planning Directorate (CMPD) in 2009. 
!e CMPD merges the strategic planning functions 
of DG E VIII (military crisis management) and DGE 
IX (civilian crisis management), and incorporates 
elements of the EU’s Civil-Military Cell from the EU 
Military Staff. !e CMPD has the potential to sig-
nificantly improve the coordination of civil-military 
capabilities and operations. !is could move the EU 
toward a genuinely comprehensive approach to crisis 
management; something it highlights as its “added 
value” over other international organizations. 
Despite focusing mostly on formalizing previ-
ous CSDP developments, the LT does provide 
some innovation. First, the treaty includes a Mutual 
8Assistance clause, which states that, “If a member 
state is the victim of armed aggression on its terri-
tory, the other member states shall have towards it 
an obligation of aid and assistance by all means in 
their power.” !is seems an extremely robust defense 
guarantee, but it is subsequently diluted by the need 
to satisfy those states that feared it would undermine 
NATO and those still protecting their “neutrality.” 
Perhaps the most notable implication of the Mutual 
Assistance Clause is that it signaled the formal end 
of the Western European Union (WEU), whose role 
had largely already been appropriated by CSDP. On 
March 31, 2010, a statement by the WEU Perma-
nent Council announced its decision to “terminate” 
the modified Brussels Treaty and thereby the organi-
zation, preferably by June 2011.
Second, and potentially much more significant, 
the LT establishes permanent structured cooperation 
in defense (PSCD). !is allows for an “advanced” 
group of willing and able states to further inte-
grate and enhance their military capabilities, even 
if other states do not wish to do so. PSCD is one 
area where the LT may make an important contri-
bution to CSDP and EU military capabilities. It 
has the potential (that is all it is at the moment) to 
reinvigorate capability development and move the 
EU toward its goal of being a global security actor. 
PSCD, if activated, will complement the largely 
bottom-up capability initiatives with a more ambi-
tious top-down approach. PSCD has the ability to set 
binding capability commitments monitored by the 
EDA. However, the initial criteria for participating 
in PSCD, being able to contribute to an EU battle 
group (which all states do to some degree) coupled 
with the vaguer commitment to more intensively 
develop defense capacities, is perhaps too inclusive 
an approach. Adopting this methodology, rather 
than a tougher set of potentially exclusive capability 
and defense spending based criteria, risks continuing 
the lowest common denominator approach that has 
hampered CSDP’s development.
Overall, the LT puts into place an institutional 
framework that should allow for the better coordi-
nation of EU foreign policy and, therefore, CSDP. 
Politically it is important in formalizing earlier 
developments, but, aside from introducing PSCD, 
the treaty did not add a great deal to what CSDP was 
already doing, and has not yet reinvigorated Euro-
pean military capability programs.
National Factors Shaping Military 
Capabilities in the EU
While European level developments in the form of 
the LT may not have had a major impact on CSDP, 
events at the national level may be more significant. 
EU ambitions for improved military capabilities are 
being affected by three key issues across its member 
states: the low priority accorded to defense spend-
ing by national electorates, the lack of political will 
and public support for further European integration, 
and the economic constraints facing many European 
states struggling with budget deficits and national 
debts that will take a decade or more to turn around. 
First, it is politically very difficult to make a case 
for maintaining, let alone increasing, defense spend-
ing in Europe given the relatively benign security 
environment. !is is even more so at a time of 
significant spending cuts across EU member states. 
Defense consistently ranks low on the list of priorities 
for EU citizens, with just two percent mentioning 
it as a concern in the Eurobarometer (European 
Commission 2011). Even when security challenges 
such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, energy, migration, climate change, 
cyber security, organized crime, and failed states are 
outlined in national security strategies and speeches, 
the public often see a limited role for defense policy 
and the armed forces. Even where European militar-
ies are engaged, notably in Afghanistan and Libya, 
public support for the operations is low as they see 
little connection between those operations and their 
own security. In 2010 the German and British public, 
sixty-two and sixty-three percent respectively, wanted 
their armed forces to withdraw from Afghanistan 
by the end of the year (Penfold 2010; BBC 2010). 
Public support for NATO’s air operations in Libya 
is also fragile, with one report suggesting as few as 
thirty-five percent and a high of forty-five percent 
of the UK public supporting the operation (Wells 
2011).
Second, after the struggles to get the LT ratified, 
there is little political or public appetite for further 
European integration, especially not through treaty 
developments. !e politicians do not want to embark 
on another round of sensitive and complicated nego-
tiations, which may also unravel previous agreements. 
In the UK the Conservative led coalition government 
ruled out any further transfer of powers to the EU 
during the current parliamentary term, which ends 
in 2015. Meanwhile, the publics of many EU states 
are becoming increasingly apathetic toward, or highly 
skeptical of, European integration. !ere is no single 
reason for the growing skepticism toward further 
integration, but the outcome is clear, a significant 
pause for reflection on the purpose and direction of 
European integration. 
However, the limited political and public support 
for further integration, or even cooperation, may be 
outweighed by the third set of developments at the 
national level. !e impact of the 2008-09 banking 
crisis and subsequent economic recession has severely 
constrained government spending across the EU. In 
 While the 2007 deadline 
was met, the quality of the 
battle groups varied substan-
tially, and no battle group 
has yet been deployed. 
 Even where European 
militaries are engaged, 
notably in Afghanistan and 
Libya, public support for the 
operations is low as they see 
little connection between 
those operations and their 
own security.
9the UK, the leading EU military power, the defense 
budget could not escape the coalition government’s 
spending cuts. !e UK’s Strategic Defence and Secu-
rity Review (SDSR) and Comprehensive Spending 
Review in the autumn of 2010 led to an eight percent 
cut in the defense budget. While this was much 
less than many government departments, several 
being cut by over twenty percent, it is a significant 
reduction leading to cuts in personnel numbers 
and equipment programs across all three services. It 
quickly became apparent that the cuts would actu-
ally be deeper as the UK sought to plug the £36bn 
“black hole” in defense procurement. !ese cuts are 
occurring at the very time the UK is playing a central 
role in the military operation in Libya. Similarly, 
France has had to make cuts to its defense spending 
when it too is taking on extra commitments in Libya 
and Ivory Coast. In June 2010 the French Ministry 
of Defence announced cuts of €3.5 billion, or about 
four percent of the defense budget (not including 
pensions) between 2011-13 (Agence France-Presse 
2010). !e government pledged that this would not 
affect major equipment programs, and still hopes that 
a significant portion of the cuts will be offset by the 
sale of assets such as military barracks. Yet significant 
delays to a number of air force projects, including 
the new multi role tanker transport aircraft and 
the upgrade of the Mirage 2000D fighter-bomber, 
have already been announced. !e trend is clear. 
Constrained government budgets are leading to 
significant defense cuts regardless of increased com-
mitments. !is disjuncture between spending cuts 
and growing commitments illustrates the need for 
European states to collaborate more closely to retain 
military influence on the international stage. 
!is realization is one of the drivers behind 
the Anglo-French Defence Cooperation Treaty 
announced in November 2010. !e treaty outlined 
plans for a 10,000 combined and joint expedition-
ary force; a UK-French integrated carrier group (the 
UK is changing its future carrier to a catapult and 
arresting gear system so it is compatible with French 
and US aircraft); common support for the A400M 
in maintenance, logistics, and training; technol-
ogy sharing for submarines; cooperation in satellite 
communications; joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV) projects and longer-term combat UAVs; and 
increased defense industry access. Alongside this 
treaty there was also a separate fifty-year agreement 
on the politically symbolic and militarily sensitive 
issue of nuclear weapons, which includes collabora-
tion on warhead testing and arsenal security. !e 
cooperation treaty, unlike the Saint-Malo Declara-
tion, is not aimed at reinvigorating the EU mili-
tary capabilities program. !e UK has long been 
disillusioned by the failure of many EU states to 
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match their rhetoric of military capability improve-
ments with the political will to actually invest in and 
transform their armed forces. More recently, France 
has also lost patience, and sees cooperation with the 
UK as essential to the future of its armed forces. 
Rather than looking to CSDP the Anglo-French 
treaty focused on ensuring national power projection 
capabilities for the UK and France to try and ensure 
they continue to be influential military actors on the 
world stage. 
Nevertheless, despite not being about CSDP as 
such, the agreement indicates clearly that pooling, 
specialization, collaboration, and, in the long term, 
even integration will be the only way for European 
national militaries to continue to have some global 
role. If the Europeans want such a global role, then 
similar agreements need to be developed between 
other EU member states. Alternatively, if other states 
shift from rhetoric to action, in the longer term, 
the Anglo-French agreement could be built upon to 
include other states. !is would, directly or indirectly, 
help the EU to fulfill its CSDP objectives. 
!e determinants of defense integration
Despite the significant obstacle of the lack of appetite 
among politicians and the public for further Euro-
pean integration, the economic downturn, coupled 
with the refocusing of US foreign and defense policy, 
may push EU states toward more collaboration in 
defense policy and military capabilities. !e fiscal 
and economic constraints in many EU states, large 
and small, may gradually bring to an end the idea of 
completely self-sufficient and autonomous national 
European armies. !is will not happen overnight, 
but the economic realities suggest this is no longer an 
unimaginable scenario. Politically, few states want to 
give up national armed forces; sovereignty, prestige, 
and influence are all powerful reasons for preserving 
them. However, economically, it is becoming increas-
ingly untenable for many states, even the larger EU 
members, to maintain the full range of military 
capabilities for national defense and crisis manage-
ment operations. Many EU states have already made 
the decision to relinquish certain capabilities, while 
the armed forces of others are being whittled away 
in the salami-slicing approach to defense budget cuts 
epitomized most recently in the UK. 
!e threat to completely self-sufficient national 
militaries is not, therefore, from further political 
integration and the supranationalism of the EU, as 
the UK and other states fear, but from the global 
economic downturn, budget deficits, national debt, 
and the ensuing cuts in European defense budgets. 
!e economic circumstances mean, paraphrasing 
Alan Milward, for the sake of their survival, national 
armed forces in Europe need to coordinate further. 
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Even in the politically sensitive area of defense policy, 
it may be that the EU is needed to “rescue” national 
armed forces by facilitating the coordination of 
specialization and resource pooling to ensure that EU 
member states can still draw on the full spectrum of 
capabilities for crisis management operations. Despite 
continuing foreign policy divisions within the EU 
and the lack of political and public desire for further 
collaboration or integration, economic circumstances 
may see CSDP re-emerge as a vehicle which allows 
national armed forces to survive, but in a much more 
coordinated or integrated format. Hence, despite the 
hopes that the Lisbon Treaty would drive forward 
EU foreign, security, and defense policy, it is national 
level economic constraints rather than EU-level grand 
political design that may necessitate EU member 
states moving closer to a “European army.”
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CSDP is Dead. Long Live CSDP!
by  JEAN Y VES HAINE
A civil war breaks out in one of Europe’s neighbour-
ing countries. Civilians are targeted and suffer signifi-
cant casualties; Europeans are divided. One of the big 
European powers unilaterally recognizes one side of 
the conflict and calls for quick military intervention, 
while another, breaking ranks at the highest diplo-
matic level, decides to abstain. Not even a minimal 
consensus can be reached. Brussels is the theatre of a 
European cacophony, and the EU becomes irrelevant. 
!e US is reluctantly dragged into the crisis. In an 
emergency meeting, the UN Security Council designs 
a resolution allowing for a no-fly zone. Nothing 
is solved on the ground, and the conflict endures. 
Sound familiar? When it happened in Bosnia twenty 
years ago, the discord of Europe was tragic. When the 
Libya crisis flared up, the same display of divisions 
was farcical. After a two-decades-long introspection, 
triggered by several Constitutional crises and failed 
referendums, after the creation of a Common Foreign 
Security Policy, which was supposed to give the 
Union one phone number and an EU “Foreign Min-
ister” who was supposed to speak in its name with 
one voice, more than ten years after the establishment 
of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
that would allow Europe to act militarily on its own, 
Europe’s coherence and influence do not seem to 
have moved one inch forward since the end of the 
Cold War. Born out of the Srebrenica massacre, 
CSDP got buried in the sand of Libya. How do we 
explain this failure? 
Different but intertwined factors have generated 
CSDP’s poor results and performances. Most are 
linked to the specificity of the European project itself, 
its post-modern identity, its peculiar hubris about the 
real leverage of power, and the requirements of secu-
rity in and beyond its neighborhood. Beyond CSDP, 
however, the incoherence of the Union’s actions, the 
bureaucratic infighting, the decreasing sense of soli-
darity among its members, and the lack of common 
foreign policies when and where they matter the most 
represent an enduring obstacle to Europe’s influence. 
When the US hegemon was still interested enough 
to fulfill European deficiencies, as it was the case in 
Bosnia and Afghanistan, Brussels could still delude 
itself about its actual strength. But when Washington 
is no longer involved, or as Philip Stevens (2011) 
quipped, when the “Yanks are going home,” as it will 
be increasingly the case, Europe’s powerlessness is 
all too obvious. Ultimately, Europe will have to pull 
itself out of a retirement and face the new realities of 
global politics. If not, the 21st century history will 
be forged and played in other regions. !e emerging 
multipolar system should thus represent the main 
impetus for more European cohesion and efficiency. 
But for that evolution to happen, Europe will have 
to significantly transform itself. !ere lies the crucial 
choice of Europe: get your act together or face 
irrelevance. 
Soft Power illusions
Despite repeated claims to the contrary, the Euro-
pean Union has failed in its ambition to become 
an autonomous strategic actor. Several elements 
explain this failure. First, European countries have 
neglected their defense budgets for too long, failed 
to transform their military apparatus, and invest in 
proper research and development programs. !e core 
objective of the Saint-Malo initiative—the founding 
act of CSDP agreed between France and the UK in 
December 1998—was about improving European 
military capabilities. !e poor display of European 
military power in Bosnia and Kosovo convinced then 
Prime Minister Tony Blair that the Union may be the 
adequate framework to improve these capabilities. 
For President Chirac, Europe couldn’t always count 
on American rescue or support; it was thus a strategic 
necessity for the Union to be able to act autono-
mously. !e first quantitative objective agreed among 
Union members was to reach a level “up to a corps,” 
(i.e., around 60,000 troops) that the EU could call 
upon—a figure that would have been necessary if 
Europe had to solve the Bosnian crisis on its own. 
Given the lack of investments and decreasing military 
budgets, this goal was quickly abandoned in favor 
of a more modest but realistic target, the so-called 
Battle Group package. !e Battle Group concept was 
a direct consequence of the Artemis Operation that 
took place in July and August 2003. !is opera-
tion represented an important step in the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) process. After 
the divide over Iraq and the disagreement at the Ter-
vuren Summit, it was the first autonomous mission 
carried by the EU outside Europe and outside the 
Berlin Plus mechanism. Following a request by UN 
Secretary-General Annan to set up a coalition of the 
willing to restore order in the Ituri region of Congo, 
so as to allow the return of a UN presence, President 
Chirac was keen to demonstrate, mostly to the US, 
that Europe, under French leadership, would be able 
to share the burden of international security in a 
manner respectful of international legality and with 
the righteous intentions of addressing humanitar-
ian concerns. !e Artemis operation was everything 
that the Iraq war was not: legitimacy was insured 
by a UN Security Council Resolution, the owner-
ship of the process belonged to the African Union, 
the use of force was only as a temporary device to 
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restore order and prevent further atrocities, and 
a devolution to African peacekeepers would deny 
any imperial design. Artemis was a UN bridging 
mission involving a quick-in, quick-out expedition-
ary force, a short-term emergency operation serving 
a broader goal (i.e., to strengthen the peace process 
in a country ravaged by nearly two decades of war). 
It took place in a relatively risky environment, and 
military officials were well aware of potential casual-
ties. Overall, the mission was a success, even though 
some shortcomings were obvious: the absence of a 
strategic reserve, the limited scope of the mission in 
space and time, and a strict exit date that signaled 
clearly to the armed belligerents the transitory nature 
of the intervention. Although the European force 
successfully secured Bunia, the rest of the Ituri region 
remained the theatre of massacre, while Bunia itself 
saw renewed violence a year after the Artemis opera-
tion See UNDPKO (2004); Ulriksen, Gourlay, and 
Mace (2004); and Faria (2004). !is operation led to 
two significant developments. 
First, a new approach based on the Battle Group 
concept (i.e., a smaller but more flexible force level) 
was agreed among Europeans to improve the Union’s 
capacity for rapid reaction and efficient intervention. 
A Battle Group is the lowest force package that can 
operate autonomously.1 On average, it is composed of 
a battalion, plus support and service support troops. 
It thus comprises around 1,500-2,000 troops. !e 
ambition, incorporated into a new Headline Goal 
2010, was to set up two Battle Groups on stand-by, 
on a six month rotation basis, putting the number of 
stand-by troops that the EU can call upon at less than 
5,000. !is latter characteristic, a stand-by force, was 
a considerable progress, yet in practice, several obsta-
cles considerably reduced the usefulness of this mili-
tary tool. Firstly, the quality of these Battle Groups 
very much depends on the contributing countries. 
Secondly, since most of these Battle Groups are 
multi-national, inter-operability is essential. Lastly, 
and most significantly, there is no mechanism for 
common funding if this force is called upon. It is 
already expensive for a medium country in Europe to 
earmark such a force for a six-month standby, but in 
case of a deployment, the cost that this country has to 
bear becomes prohibitive. And so, these much talked 
about Battle Groups have never been used, and prob-
ably never will be. So a decade after Saint-Malo, the 
ambition has significantly dropped, while the mis-
sions, at least on paper, have been expanded.2 What 
1  “!e EU Battle Group is the minimum military effec-
tive, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package 
capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase 
of larger operations” (EU Council Secretariat 2006).
2  !e Art. 28b of the Lisbon Treaty marginally expanded 
the classic Petersberg task: “!e Union may use civilian 
has been gained in quality has been lost in quantity. 
France and the United Kingdom initiated the second 
important development in November 2003 by 
fleshing out the role of the EU military in Africa.3 
With these Battle Groups, the EU should be able to 
respond quickly to a crisis while giving time for the 
African Union (AU) or the UN to prepare a longer-
term intervention. Short-term military missions, in a 
“quick in and quick out” framework to support the 
UN or the AU became the strategic template. !is 
was echoed by the Solana paper’s call for a European 
strategic culture aimed at “early, rapid, and robust 
interventions.” 
Yet, the Europeanization of this agenda turned out 
to become far more difficult than Paris and London 
had previously thought. Several obstacles were at 
play. At the most general level, institutions in security 
issues remain fragile, commitments provisional, and 
solidarity weak. As all realists know, because national 
interests and stakes are the crucial determinants of 
State’s actions, security institutions are rarely more 
than a temporary marriage of convenience, based 
on a common threat and a favorable aggregation of 
forces. !e European case, because it is not an Alli-
ance, despite assertions to the contrary in the Lisbon 
Treaty, suffers from a different centrifugal tendency. 
Not in the business of collective defense, the EU 
has endorsed a liberal security agenda, based on the 
Petersberg tasks, i.e. peacekeeping and humanitar-
ian operations. In this framework, participations in 
these missions are a matter of national choice, not 
of collective necessity. !is leads to the domestica-
tion of foreign policy issues and the predominance 
of national sensitivities, preferences, constraints, and 
caveats. !e collective dimension is lost through 
the prism of national experiences.4 Moreover, some 
Europeans countries have committed troops in other 
theatres, such as Afghanistan, Lebanon, or Iraq, either 
nationally or through NATO. For them, CSDP is 
and military means [for] joint disarmament operations, 
humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assist-
ance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, 
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks 
may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by 
supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their 
territories.”
3  “We now propose that the EU should build on this 
[operation Artemis] precedent so that it is able to respond 
through ESDP to future similar requests from the UN, 
whether in Africa or elsewhere” (Franco-British Declara-
tion 2003).
4  As a scholar of alliances noted long ago, “!e fact of enter-
ing into alliances does not transform national actors into 
coalition actors. !e discrete members of the alliance retain 
all of their individuality, all of their separateness despite 
assumptions to the contrary” (Fedder 1968, 81).
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a futile luxury that they cannot afford. All security 
institutions suffer from this unavoidable predica-
ment, and the EU is not different. Situations, not 
institutions, shape foreign policy choices. Neither the 
position of a European “Foreign Minister” nor the 
External Action Service will change this fundamental 
dynamic. In practice, CSDP is thus reduced to à la 
carte grouping whose actions are initiated under the 
influence of the big powers’ agenda or the congru-
ence of some members’ foreign policy objectives, but 
not by a sense of collective obligations. Every crisis 
thus demands an intense and difficult debate about 
the rationale and the stakes of a potential mission. 
If CSDP military operations have been collectively 
endorsed, in practice they have been implemented 
by few, symbolic contributions being the rule rather 
than the exception. !e political conditions that 
make a European mission possible are far away 
from the strategic requirements that would make it 
successful. 
!e second obstacle was related to the specific 
theatre of choice for these humanitarian opera-
tions (i.e., Africa). To put it mildly, the emergence 
of CSDP in Africa was not unanimously supported 
among Europeans. !e obvious instrumentalization 
by France of CSDP structures and goals was met by 
the reticence of European members with no tradition 
and no willingness to play an active military role in 
that continent, most notably Germany, which started 
to call CSDP “the French Africa Korps.” Moreover, if 
Africa was to become the main theatre of EU’s mili-
tary operations, other Brussels institutions were keen 
to reassert their specific role and added value in that 
region. !e Commission reasserted its authority on 
Africa by issuing a series of “strategic” documents to 
contain in effect the militarization of Europe’s poli-
cies in Africa and to dilute it into broader objectives 
linked to poverty and development.5 !ese docu-
ments called for “a more comprehensive approach” 
than a narrow military quick-fixing; they promoted 
a natural linkage with the UN and a reinforced part-
nership with the African Union. !e EU was willing 
to help build up African capabilities with military, 
logistics and financial aid, but the process should 
be “demand-driven.” Overall, Brussels institutions 
issued a firm reminder to France and others that the 
EU was not in the business of “colonial” interven-
tions, and that, if forces needed to be sent, it should 
5  In December 2005, the European Council endorsed 
a document entitled “!e EU and Africa: Towards a 
Strategic Partnership,” largely inspired by the Millennium 
Goals. !is document was written by the Commission, 
hardly discussed by the COREPER, and barely overseen 
by the PSC. !is institutional imbalance triggered a brief 
statement by J. Solana, the High Representative for CFSP, 
to remind the Commission that the Council and the 
ESDP-CFSP framework could not be bypassed. See also 
Bagayoko and Gibert 2009. 
remain a small part of a larger political framework 
aimed at assistance, development, state-building, and 
democratization. 
!e third obstacle is probably the most signifi-
cant, and contributed considerably to the demise 
of CSDP as it was envisioned by Paris and London 
in Saint-Malo more than a decade ago. It is related 
to what we might call the lack of a common and 
strategic culture. Fundamentally, the Union is not 
a Weberian State, and hence cannot articulate and 
implement an effective strategy. !e use of force 
remains a national prerogative that cannot be del-
egated to a superior authority, be it a lead nation or a 
European integrated Headquarter if such a command 
would exist. However, the Union has tried to articu-
late a grand strategy, the “European Security Strategy” 
document, which failed to be meaningfully revised 
in 2008, and had the ambition, at least on paper, to 
offer such a framework. Among all the deficiencies 
of this document, the weakest link was between an 
overall strategy and actual operations. !e Petersberg 
Tasks offered a framework for EU military missions, 
but by themselves they do not constitute a strategic 
umbrella, they only translate vague security prefer-
ences. As R. Betts (2000, 7) has noted, strategy is 
a distinct plan between policy and operations, “an 
idea for connecting the two rather than either of the 
two themselves.”6 !is “idea” is at the core of the 
problem. 
Among European security circles (some public 
officials, some private), an agenda inspired by the 
concept of “human security” started to emerge as 
a guiding principle of CSDP operations. Without 
addressing the ambiguity of the concept itself, human 
security offered at least in theory a convenient com-
promise between the traditional European civilian 
power and its military role. If the “post-modern” 
identity of Europe has to include a place and a 
role for the armed forces, then the area of human 
rights, peace-keeping, and state-building became the 
obvious areas for their actions, however limited. !e 
Barcelona Report commissioned by Javier Solana, 
and presented at the end 2004, was a clear attempt 
to reconcile armed forces and Europe’s “ethical” or 
“humanitarian” beliefs and values.7 !e report laid 
6  He added, “Among practitioners, politicians often conflate 
strategy with policy objectives, focusing on what the 
desired outcomes should be, simply assuming that force 
will move the adversary toward it while soldiers often con-
flate strategy with operations focusing on how to destroy 
targets or defeat enemies tactically assuming that positive 
military effects mean positive policy effects.” (Betts 2000, 
7). !is was underlined as soon as the ink of Saint-Malo 
was dry, yet more than ten years later, it is still missing. 
See, for example, Van Staden et al. (2000); Biscop and 
Coelmont (2010).
7  See Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security 
Capabilities: A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, 
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out seven principles of actions for the use of armed 
forces—the primacy of human rights, clear political 
authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, 
regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the 
appropriate ‘use of force’—and these principles were 
supposed to inform and guide CSDP operations. 
To that end the Report called for the creation of a 
human security response force, which emphasized its 
police and civilian elements. !is civilian component 
was very popular throughout Europe for at least 
three reasons. First, it underlined again the difference 
between the Venusian Europe and the Martial US at 
the moment where the regime change attempt in Iraq 
started to turn into a disaster. Second, it enhanced 
small and medium European powers’ position and 
influence in defence policies where the modesty of 
their actual military capabilities would have placed 
them into a marginal role.8 It was an opportunity to 
Europeanize CSDP, and it was indeed duly seized. 
Lastly and most importantly, it led to frame CSDP 
operations in a “post-modern” manner, one that 
did not entail any risks of actual combat against an 
identified enemy, one that significantly reduced the 
scope of the Petersberg tasks, one that couldn’t lead 
to potential casualties among European forces, and 
one that domestic public opinion will support. It 
fitted the risk-averse preferences of most decision-
makers and political parties in Europe, an aversion 
that goes well beyond the use of force (Laïdi 2010).9 
Embraced by the Commission, supported by Solana, 
shared by a majority of European actors, human 
security as a concept and as a guiding principle for 
actual operations became an extremely useful tool to 
avoid a deemed excessive militarization of security 
policies in Africa. It became the consensual buzzword 
of the time. Following the same trajectory as its 
sister concept, “normative power,” it flooded official 
documents, and it was referred as the main, if not the 
unique, “strategic” narrative for European external 
actions (Kaldor, Martin, and Selchow 2007). 
But this narrative is the opposite of strategic 
thinking. !e human security concept by definition 
denies the possibility and disregards the probability of 
influencing a State or a sub-state actor by deterrence, 
compellence, or coercion. It presupposes a neutral-
ity and impartiality posture, while it neglects the 
geopolitical environment. It ignores the very essence 
of what a soldiers does, and dismisses how his or her 
September 15, 2004. See also Matlary (2006). One scholar 
uses the term “humanitarian power Europe” (Meyer 2006, 
141) and also Manners (2008). 
8  !e civilian side of CSDP has not been a great success 
either. See Korski & Gowan (2009). 
9  According to Transatlantic polls in 2007, only twenty 
percent of Europeans supported committing more troops 
for combat actions in general (German Marshall Fund of 
the United States 2007).
mere presence is perceived. It considers the EU as an 
NGO, and conflates the rank of its armed forces to 
the status of Red Cross personnel. As an alternative to 
“early, rapid, and when necessary, robust” interven-
tions, human security is a dangerous illusion.10 
CSDP operations, in Congo, in Chad, or in Bosnia 
became more symbolic than strategic; their rationale 
had more to do with Europe’s image, posturing, and 
legitimacy than with Africa’s or the Balkans’ strategi-
cally relevant interests. !is was not what France and 
the UK has signed for at Saint-Malo. 
Lonely at the bottom?
!e British confidence in the “Brusselization” process 
in security and defence has always been very low, 
but the dissatisfaction of France has now become 
obvious. France had been the main supporter of 
a European role in security and defence, mainly 
because it was a traditional political ambition to build 
an independent Europe from Washington. Paris has 
always endorsed the role of a would-be soft-balancer. 
But France may not want to repeat the experience of 
taming its own interests and leverage in Africa for the 
sake of a minimal European consensus, while Paris 
has to carry the bulk of such operations. !e Chad 
operations may turn out to be the last of its kind 
for these reasons (Haine forthcoming). !e CSDP 
exercise may not be worth the candle if it means the 
deference of French interests and power to a Europe 
which seems so reluctant to be engaged in power 
politics. In others words, the current security culture 
framework has become a burden to the classic French 
ambition of a Europe puissance and most importantly, 
an obstacle to French strategic interests and role. For 
Berlin, the translation of Brussels security culture 
into deployments in Africa has also triggered a dis-
sonance process, not based on the culture itself, but 
on the strategic stakes at hand. Germany’s tradi-
tional European preference has led to an ontological 
security problem linked to an activism in Africa that 
Berlin doesn’t share. Moreover, the “early and robust” 
deployment envisaged by Paris and London seemed 
contradictory to Germany’s core pacifist culture 
(Speck 2011).
When the three most powerful countries in 
Europe are dissatisfied about the CSDP process, this 
can only lead to a crisis of legitimacy of the institu-
tion itself. !e dissonance level is such that it has 
started to trigger emancipation options. Institutions 
may be disregarded if they don’t offer meaningful 
and relevant added-value, if they don’t respond to 
10  For a trenchant critique, see Paris (2001). As one scholars 
nicely put it, the military ethos that it induces is: “Pretend 
to be warlike but don’t fight” (Koivula 2009, 171). Some, 
at last, have recognized that the operational meaning of the 
concept is a failure. See Matlary (2008); Martin and Owen 
(2010). 
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expectations and interests, or if they are instru-
mentalized toward strictly national purposes. !ey 
become obsolete if cheating or free-riding repeatedly 
occur with impunity, if “voice” remains unheard 
and “loyalty” unrewarded. !en the “exit” option 
becomes the preferred choice, sometimes officially—
Denmark —more often implicitly—the Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom, and to some extent Ger-
many—while at the same time the “loyalty” leaning 
is often hypocritically exercised by contributing only 
symbolically to the institution.11 France has been the 
most loyal player until it considered the burden-shar-
ing as too disproportionate, or, to put it in another 
way, until its own loyalty was not matched by others. 
Paris seems indeed to have reordered its relation-
ships priorities outside Brussels with strategically 
meaningful allies, especially the United Kingdom. 
!e Lancaster House Defence Treaty of November 
2010 was significant in this regard. It is striking how 
this Franco-British cooperation was about Paris and 
London’s respective power perceptions as declin-
ing world powers rather than as leaders of Europe. 
Indeed, Europe and CSDP are barely mentioned in 
the Treaty.12 To put it differently, Europe as a legiti-
mate framework has failed to mobilize and gener-
ate enough traction to have a significant role at the 
strategic level.13 
It is thus not surprising that the operation in 
Libya was initiated outside CSDP structures and 
processes. London and Paris turned to New York and 
Washington rather than Brussels. But the operations 
reveal a crucial weakness that Europe has tended to 
ignore for at least two decades. !e US’ willingness to 
support, assist, and contribute to military operations 
where its own national security interest is not really 
threatened is waning. Less and less Washington can 
be considered a European power; more and more 
Europe is alone to tackle its own neighborhood. 
!ere is nothing specifically new in this trend, but 
the American economic crisis, the prudent and prag-
matic approach of the Obama administration, and 
US public opinion’s increasing war fatigue had made 
this reluctance more obvious. Washington, in an 
11  As Albert Hirschman (1970, 78 and 80-81) has noted, 
“Loyalty, far from being irrational, can serve the socially 
useful purpose of preventing deterioration from becoming 
cumulative, as it so often does when there is no barrier to 
exit… While loyalty postpones exit, its very existence is 
predicated on the possibility of exit. !at even the most 
loyal member can exit is often an important part of his 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the organization.” 
12  As a scholar argued, “!e real threat [to CSDP], then, 
is not the Franco-British agreement, but the fact that the 
strengthening of Franco-British defence cooperation is 
taking place against a background of significant frustra-
tion in both London and Paris over EU defence efforts.” 
(O’Donnell 2011, 428).
13  For an eloquent summary on the importance of social 
mobilization in strategy, see Howard (1979). 
emerging “heterogeneous” multipolarity14, may not 
be ready, willing, or able to listen to Europe’s pleas for 
collective action that answers strictly Europeans con-
cerns. As Robert Jervis (1997, 104) has argued, “there 
certainly would be difficulties if crucial states did 
not recognize their place in the system.” !e sooner 
Europeans will recognize their intrinsic position in 
the international system, the better. !en Europeans 
may be willing to reconsider a CSDP that would 
defend and protect their interests—like the current 
Atalanta Somalia operation (the only CSDP strategic 
mission)—a CSDP based on strategic calculations 
and not on an idealistic chimera. In the immediate 
future, this is, however, unlikely. Europe has dramatic 
problems of its own: the debt crisis is consuming 
most of its energy and focus, solidarity among Euro-
pean countries is vanishing, while public opinion 
and national predilection increasingly resent Brussels 
institutions. !e long-term prediction is thus, that 
CSDP will increasingly become a necessity. But the 
argument has already been made two decades ago. 
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!e European Union in  
(In-)Action: Brussels and the 
Arab Spring
by  JOLYON HOWORTH
Throughout the decade-long process of European 
Union (EU) Treaty Review, most commentators were 
agreed that the key institutional innovation of what 
eventually became the Treaty of Lisbon would be 
the introduction of the double-hatted post of High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
and Vice-President of the Commission (HR-VP). 
!ere were three main reasons for this. !e first 
was political: the widely perceived desirability of 
ever greater coordination of the foreign and security 
policies of the EU’s twenty-seven member states. !e 
second was operational: the need for synergies, on 
the ground, between the main thrusts of the Union’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and 
its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP): 
trade, development aid, humanitarian assistance, and 
crisis management. !e third was institutional: the 
growing recognition by member states that effective 
international action on the part of the EU required 
the existence, in Brussels, of centralized decision-
shaping agencies. !ese were not reasons dreamed up 
in Brussels by starry-eyed Europhiles. !ey reflect the 
collective wisdom of the EU’s twenty-seven member 
states, which unanimously authorized and ratified the 
new institutional arrangements. !e first incumbent 
of the HR-VP position, Catherine Ashton (UK), was 
thus required, according to the terms of the Treaty, to 
“conduct the Union’s common foreign and security 
policy [and] contribute […] to the development of 
that policy.” !is was clearly a position requiring 
leadership skills. !e new arrangements had barely 
been in place one year when the “Arab Spring” 
offered a stern test of their effectiveness.
!e EU was totally unprepared for the uprisings 
across the Middle East in December 2010 and early 
2011. Unfortunately for Ashton, in her capacity as 
HR-VP, she was caught right in the middle of the 
chaotic responses forthcoming from the various 
member states and proved incapable of imposing 
discipline on an orchestra which was already playing 
in cacophonic disharmony. Statements on the crises 
in Tunisia and Egypt, emanating from the office of 
the Council Presidency, from the President of the 
European Parliament (EP), a joint statement from 
UK prime minister David Cameron, German Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel, and French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy, notes from different political groupings 
within the EP, not to mention from different Euro-
pean capitals, all undercut the statement eventually 
issued by Ashton herself. In a situation where the 
French foreign minister Michelle Alliot-Marie, in an 
early intervention in the Tunisian crisis, had offered 
President Ben-Ali French riot police and tear gas to 
help deal with his crowd problems, and in which 
prime minister Silvio Berlusconi and his foreign 
minister Franco Frattini were issuing statements sup-
portive of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, what 
hope did Ashton have of drafting a “common” EU 
statement? In the event, the somewhat anodyne draft 
she eventually generated provoked the ire of David 
Cameron, who publicly reprimanded her on the 
eve of a European summit for the lack of “clear and 
strong language to show Egypt there would be conse-
quences unless the repression stopped.” !e HR-VP’s 
cause was not assisted when the interim Egyptian 
government in mid-February announced that it 
was too busy to receive her. She was subsequently 
upstaged by the British prime minister himself, who 
became the first leader to meet the new Egyptian 
government on February 21. 
!ese events took place exactly twenty years after 
the eruption, in the Balkans, of the Wars of Yugoslav 
Succession. While the much-derided observation of 
the then Luxemburg foreign minister Jacques Poos 
(“It is the hour of Europe”) has entered the annals 
of public ridicule, the strategic incapacity of the EU 
to tackle regional crisis management subsequently 
became the focus of an academic and policy-wonk 
cottage industry of considerable proportions. For 
twenty years, sparked by its military inadequacy 
in 1991, the EU set about forging security policy 
institutions, rationalizing military and civilian 
capacity, fine-tuning decision-making procedures, 
and establishing leadership positions, all of whose 
fundamental raison d’être was to bestow upon the 
Union the wherewithal to tackle international crises 
in a coherent and robust manner, and above all to be 
ready to act whenever the next major crisis erupted. 
As CSDP acquired capacity and direction throughout 
the 2000s, the EU sought to differentiate itself from 
NATO by arrogating to itself primary responsibility 
for regional crisis management, and by insisting that 
NATO should prioritize collective defense. After the 
2009 ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, it was widely 
claimed, Europe would be better placed than in 1991 
to engage in crisis management.
!e Arab Spring has demonstrated the relative 
emptiness of those claims. Twenty years of adaptation 
appears to have counted for very little in the complex, 
contentious, and competitive wrangling, which has 
pitted the member states against one another in 
North Africa, and particularly over the Libyan inter-
vention. North Africa in general is the direct geo-
graphical neighbor of the EU. !e distance between 
the Tunisian coast and the Italian island of Lampe-
dusa is some seventy-five miles, and between Tripoli 
and Malta some 160 miles. !e development of 
 Many analysts now 
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 NATO is essentially 
perceived by the rest of the 
world as a US-dominated 
alliance.
 Ashton has made it 
clear on several occasions, 
notably in a speech in Buda-
pest on February 25, that she 
does not consider the EU to 
be a serious military player 
and that it should confine 
itself to the implementation 
of soft power.
North Africa has been an EU project for over fifteen 
years, first through the “Barcelona Process” and, since 
2007, through the “Union for the Mediterranean.” 
!e Maghreb is, quite literally, Europe’s “backyard.” 
And yet, despite a strong leadership role being taken 
in the 2011 military operations by key EU member 
states, notably the UK and France, there was never 
any question of framing the Libyan mission as an EU 
(CSDP) crisis management task. On the contrary, the 
command was rapidly taken over by NATO, which, 
in the event, somewhat paradoxically, was presented, 
at least in Washington, as a “European alternative” to 
an American command structure. 
!ere are two main sets of reasons underlying this 
state of affairs: diplomatic/institutional and political/
military, with highly personal factors adding a further 
degree of complexity.
Diplomatic/institutional
From the outset of his administration, Barack Obama 
made it clear that a post-Bush United States would 
not rush to intervene unilaterally in crisis manage-
ment situations, would actively seek to mobilize 
the international community, would partner with 
appropriate regional actors and prioritize multilat-
eralism. !eoretically, this should have placed the 
European Union in prime position as the lead entity 
in the resolution of the Libyan crisis—perhaps in 
conjunction with others such as the African Union, 
the Arab League, and the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference. !e first manifestation of a collective 
EU reaction came during the meeting of the twenty-
seven foreign ministers on February 21, only four 
days after the February 17 “Day of Rage” in Tripoli. 
!e communiqué restricted itself to demanding an 
“immediate end to violence.” Within days the EU 
member states were quarreling with each other over 
a minimalist response. Italy, Malta, and Cyprus held 
out (for about a week) against French, German, and 
Dutch proposals to impose sanctions on the Gaddafi 
family. Various European parliamentarians called 
rapidly for a no-fly zone (NFZ), but such suggestions 
were immediately shot down—ironically in view 
of the sequel—both by NATO Secretary General 
Rasmussen and by the new French foreign minister 
Alain Juppé. 
!e one institutional voice which was designed 
to articulate a collective EU position, that of High 
Representative Catherine Ashton, was effectively 
silent while she sought, at each step, to define what 
amounted to the lowest political common denomi-
nator among the member states. !us, while all 
around her various European leaders and officials 
were making various proposals for robust action, she 
was about the last to call for sanctions, the last to 
make a statement that Gaddafi should go, the last to 
make contact with the Benghazi-based Transitional 
National Committee (TNC), and the last to line up 
behind military action—which she resisted strongly 
until March 17, when it was authorized by the UN 
Security Council under Resolution 1973 (at which 
point she switched to “welcoming” it). Ashton’s 
resistance to the imposition of a no-fly zone led to a 
blazing public row both with her own Prime Minister 
David Cameron and with French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy at the European Council meeting on March 
11. Both men accused her of failing to rise to the 
occasion with a firm European statement of intent. 
Ashton felt that, in articulating an EU position, she 
had to pay close attention to those EU member states 
which were uncomfortable with the Union playing a 
lead (particularly a military) role. She was, in many 
ways, instrumental in ensuring that, when the inter-
national community decided to act, the European 
Union per se took a back seat to its own member 
states, to the US, and to NATO. Ashton has made 
it clear on several occasions, notably in a speech in 
Budapest on February 25, that she does not consider 
the EU to be a serious military player and that it 
should confine itself to the implementation of soft 
power. Dissatisfaction with her performance reached 
a crescendo during the Libyan crisis. A survey of three 
hundred European officials and decision-shapers into 
the effectiveness of the second Barroso Commission 
carried out by the consultancy firm Burson Marsteller 
ranked Ashton firmly as the least effective of all the 
commissioners, with 37.7% judging her performance 
to be “disappointing,” 29.1% to be “below average,” 
and another 17.8% to be “average.” Only 9.9% gave 
her a score of “good.” Many analysts now question 
the usefulness and indeed the future of this key 
position originally designed to help the EU to “speak 
with a common voice.”
Ashton’s problem was compounded by the fact 
that the EU member states were bitterly divided over 
the response to the Libyan crisis. Italy, the former 
colonial power, had in 2008 signed a “reconcilia-
tion pact” with Gaddafi under which Rome paid $5 
billion in compensation for its colonial occupation, 
and Tripoli pledged to stem trans-Mediterranean 
migration, a problem of growing urgency for the 
Italian government since the Tunisian crisis drove 
thousands of migrants to Lampedusa. Both sides had 
agreed multi-billion dollar industrial and commer-
cial investment projects. Silvio Berlusconi and his 
foreign minister Franco Frattini were initially loath to 
prejudice these arrangements. Nicolas Sarkozy had, in 
2007, effectively “rehabilitated” Gaddafi by inviting 
him to Paris for the July 14 celebrations, which syn-
chronized with the launch of the French president’s 
pet project, the “Union for the Mediterranean.” 
But that visit had been hugely unpopular domesti-
cally and Sarkozy, who is running for re-election 
in 2012 and trailing badly in the polls, had no 
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compunction about waging war against the Libyan 
leader. He was among the first to call for a no-fly 
zone, the first to say that Gaddafi must go, the first to 
recognize the Benghazi-based Transitional National 
Council (TNC), and the first to use military force 
in Libya. His unilateral recognition of the TNC was 
announced the very day before a European Council 
meeting on March 11, which had been summoned 
precisely to reach collective agreement on such issues. 
Two days later, Italy, concerned that France might 
become the privileged partner of a post-Gaddafi 
Libya, performed an about turn and also recognized 
the Benghazi Committee. David Cameron was also 
keen to take a lead in the Libyan case, mindful of 
Britain’s role as a major European military power and 
of US pressures on burden-sharing. Angela Merkel 
blew hot and cold on Libya, initially keen to criticize 
and demand sanctions but determined at all cost to 
avoid military action. Germany’s decision to abstain 
(in the company of Brazil, Russia, India, and China – 
the “BRICs”) on the UNSC Resolution 1973 which 
authorized military action, did not spare Merkel the 
wrath of the German electorate in several key Länder 
elections, and is widely considered among Germany’s 
public intellectuals to have been a major faux pas. 
Political/Military
Given the degree of dissonance among the EU 
member states, there was never any question that a 
hypothetical Libyan mission could be launched under 
the aegis of CSDP. NATO emerged as the logical 
next choice. However, the NATO option was initially 
opposed by a number of leading players. !e first 
was Barack Obama, reluctant, both for diplomatic 
and for domestic political reasons, to be perceived 
as the lead actor in a third military campaign in a 
Muslim country. When David Cameron announced, 
at the end of February, that the UK was planning to 
organize a NFZ, probably coordinated via NATO, 
the American top brass, fearing entrapment, went 
into denial mode, experts being rapidly mobilized 
to explain that the imposition of a NFZ would be a 
massive and hazardous operation requiring air supe-
riority over the entire territory of Libya. !e Obama 
administration was assuming that the Europeans 
would step up to the plate without involving NATO. 
Was this not precisely the type of scenario which 
CSDP had been devised for? NATO is essentially 
perceived by the rest of the world as a US-dominated 
alliance. !e alliance’s only previous military actions 
have come in Kosovo and Afghanistan, both being 
massively dominated by and associated with US 
policy. But the US was not the only body to resist 
assigning military operations to NATO. President 
Sarkozy was highly reluctant even to assign opera-
tional responsibility (let alone political responsibil-
ity) to NATO. He had signed a bilateral defensive 
treaty with the UK in November 2010, and saw the 
Libyan operation as the ideal opportunity for the two 
major European military powers to engage in joint 
operational and political leadership under a joint 
command structure. !is met with firm opposi-
tion from the British who, however much they may 
recently have flirted with CSDP, remain instinctively 
Atlanticist. !e NATO label was also initially resisted 
both by Germany, which opposed military action in 
any case, and by Turkey, which, for historical, cultural 
and political reasons, was opposed to any Western 
intervention in Libya.
However, Turkey was even more fiercely opposed 
to the notion of France assuming leadership. Prime 
Minister Erdogan’s relationship with President 
Sarkozy has long been extremely rocky, not least 
because of Sarkozy’s opposition to Turkish member-
ship of the EU. When Sarkozy omitted to invite 
Turkey to the international conference on Libya 
which France convened in Paris on March 19 to 
try to organize political control of the operation 
launched under the UN mandate, Erdogan was 
incensed. He therefore did an about-turn and made 
common cause with Cameron in lobbying for NATO 
to assume operational command. At least that way 
Turkey might enjoy some sort of control over the 
mercurial Sarkozy. Obama, realizing that there was 
by now no alternative, agreed to an eventual NATO 
remit after an initial US-led assault, codenamed 
Operation Odyssey Dawn. However, for the US 
administration, there were two caveats. !e first 
was that the US, after briefly deploying its “unique” 
capacity to take out Libya’s air defense systems and 
loyalist targets on the ground, would thereafter 
take a back seat in the military dimension of the 
mission. !e second was that NATO, on inheriting 
the US lead, should be spun as an objectively “non-
American” command structure. If Europeans could 
not take the lead under CSDP, they could be coerced 
into taking it under NATO. In some ways, this was 
a scenario which the US had been floating ever since 
the Balkan Wars: a NATO operation in which the US 
did not wish to play a major part, and which would 
essentially be run by Europeans, using US assets. In 
the 1990s, this scenario was known as the European 
Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). In 2002, it 
was superseded by a new arrangement, known as 
“Berlin Plus,” under which the newly empowered EU 
military capacities of CSDP would borrow NATO 
(i.e., US) assets in order to conduct missions without 
US forces. Operation Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina 
has been the archetype of such an arrangement. 
However, there are several major problems with 
the notion that the US has “handed over” the Libyan 
operation to a “Europe-led NATO.” First, as far as 
the operational chain of command is concerned, 
the Canadian three-star chosen to head NATO’s 
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Operation Unified Protector, Lt. General Charles 
Bouchard, reports directly to SACEUR, US Admiral 
James Stavridis. Secondly, although the US has 
reduced fairly substantially its air sorties, many of 
the key intelligence, C4 and logistics assets behind 
this “non-US” operation remain American. SHAPE 
is a US dominated command center. As the NATO 
mission appeared in late April 2011 to be running 
out of further options without succeeding in dislodg-
ing Gaddafi, pressure began to mount on the Obama 
administration to return to the fray. !ird, the “Euro-
pean” input to Operation Unified Protector was fairly 
minimal. Only ten of the twenty-one EU member 
states of NATO participated in the mission in any 
capacity at all. Bulgaria and Romania were involved 
only in the naval dimension of the arms embargo. 
All other EU member states, including Germany 
and Poland, were essentially spectators. Of the eight 
EU member states offering air capacity, only four 
(UK, France, Belgium and Denmark) were involved 
in striking targets on the ground. !e Netherlands, 
Spain, Italy and Greece signaled political caveats 
restricting them to an air-air only role, which had 
limited usefulness given that Gaddafi’s fighters were 
grounded from the outset. In late April, Italy shifted 
its stance and also began targeting Gaddafi’s ground 
assets. !e UK and France voiced growing frustration 
at the fact that they alone were carrying more than 
50% of the burden of the entire mission. 
As for the political control of the mission, the 
picture was even less clear. Officially, the North 
Atlantic Council (NAC) was involved, but given that 
several of its leading members were opposed to the 
mission itself, the role of NATO’s formal decision-
making body remained unreadable. !e “Contact 
Group” of forty odd states and bodies, which met on 
three occasions in March and April (Paris, London, 
and Qatar) proved far too unwieldy an entity to have 
credible political oversight. Political control appeared 
to be being exercised from Washington, Paris, and 
London. !is suspicion was confirmed on April 15 
when Barack Obama, Nicolas Sarkozy, and David 
Cameron signed a joint op-ed in the leading Western 
newspapers. !eir article, which amounted to a major 
political manifesto, stated that, while faithfully car-
rying out the UNSC mandate given under Resolu-
tion 1973, which involves protection of the Libyan 
people, the three leaders would not rest until Gaddafi 
has been removed from power, “so long as Gaddafi 
is in power, NATO must maintain its operations” 
pending “a genuine transition from dictatorship to 
an inclusive constitutional process […] led by a new 
generation of leaders.” Regime change was not called 
for in the UN resolution, and the three leaders gave 
no indication of how it was to be achieved. Hope 
hardly substitutes for policy. 
In this first major crisis of the post-Lisbon world, 
the EU failed significantly to live up to the expecta-
tions, which had been vested in the new institutions 
and mechanisms of CSDP. Several commentators 
concluded (over-hastily) that CSDP had been given 
the coup de grace in the deserts of Libya. !is will not 
prove to be the case. !e Polish presidency of the 
EU, launched on July 1, 2011, signaled its inten-
tion of making security and defense a top priority 
of its rotating tenure. Two major conclusions may 
be drawn from the Libyan crisis. First, that the EU’s 
CFSP needs to be infused with far more long-term 
strategic planning than has hitherto been the case. 
Circumstances around the entire borders of the 
Union, from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Baltic Sea, 
are rife with potential crisis. It makes no sense to wait 
until the next crisis erupts before thinking about a 
political response. !e second conclusion is that the 
way the first post-holder of the HR-VP position has 
defined the job hangs a major question mark over its 
ultimate purpose. !e post was intended to involve 
leadership. !e EU does not need a magnificently 
paid secretary to translate the views of its twenty-
seven member states into lowest common denomina-
tor prose. Many have concluded that the HR-VP job 
is an impossible one to assume. !at is not correct. 
What the position needs is a post-holder capable of 
exercising leadership.
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